Do firms issue stock when prices seem irrationally high? Do they invest or save the proceeds from the sale of overvalued stocks? Is value created or destroyed in the process? This paper uses a novel identification strategy to tackle these questions. We examine the capital investment, stock issuance, and cash savings behavior of financially constrained and unconstrained non-tech manufacturers ("old economy firms") around the 1990's technology bubble. Our results suggest that, because they relax financing constraints, high stock prices affect corporate policies. In particular, during the bubble, constrained non-tech firms issued equity in response to mispricing and used the proceeds to invest. They also saved part of those funds in their cash accounts. We do not find similar patterns for unconstrained non-tech firms, neither for tech firms. Our findings do not support the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders, destroying economic value. Rather, our evidence implies that what appears to be overvaluation in one sector of the economy may have welfare-increasing effects across other sectors.
Introduction
Financial economists have increasingly cast doubt on the view that market prices e¢ ciently re ‡ect fundamental …rm values. While most of the literature emphasizes the asset pricing implications of market misvaluation, few studies look at whether mispricing has real-side consequences. In a seminal article, Fischer and Merton (1984) argue that managers should take advantage of irrationally low discount rates for their …rms'equity by issuing stocks and investing the proceeds. Subsequent studies by Morck et al. (1990) , Barro (1990) , Blanchard et al. (1993) , Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1994) , Chirinko and Schaller (1996) , and Lamont (2000) , among others, test the idea that stock market ‡uctuations a¤ect …rm investment over and above fundamentals. Using mostly aggregate data, these studies report mixed results. Morck et al. and Blanchard et al., for example, argue that the "irrational" component of stock valuation does not a¤ect real investment. In essence, they …nd that the component of prices that is not summarized by standard proxies for the marginal product of investment (e.g., pro…tability and sales growth) fails to explain corporate spending. In contrast, Barro and Galeotti and Schiantarelli, …nd explanatory power in the irrational component of prices. 1 Whether stock prices in ‡uence the real economy becomes a relevant concern when markets experience price bubbles. In the face of widespread mispricing, it can be rather di¢ cult for arbitrageurs to bring values back to fundamentals (see Morck et al. (1990) ). Arbitrage trading is a risky, costly activity, and in a world where traders have limited resources, mispricing may emerge and quickly spread across di¤erent securities and sectors (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). Crucially, …rms have a natural monopoly over the supply of new securities. In this context, a number of questions arise: Do corporate managers take advantage of mispricing during bubbles? If so, what do …rms do with the proceeds from the sale of overvalued stocks? Do they save or invest? Is value created or destroyed in the process?
The answers to these questions can shed light on the economic consequences of market (mis)valuation.
When managers work in the best interest of shareholders, the Fischer-Merton argument goes, they should sell their …rms' stocks whenever equity is "overvalued." Managers should do so even when their private assessment of investment productivity is lower than that of investors. As discussed by Blanchard et al. (1993) , one problem with this arbitrage argument is that the sale of overvalued stocks may bene…t only current shareholders. To wit, at the rational cost of funds, the marginal investment has a zero NPV. Issuing overvalued stocks and investing the proceeds destroys value, as additional investment drives the marginal product of capital below optimal levels. As old shareholders sell their positions, new shareholders are made worse o¤ by paying a high price for stakes in …rms that, on the margin, will invest in negative NPV projects. Unless new shareholders, too, expect to sell overvalued stocks in the future (a "rational bubble"), managers will have con ‡icting incentives when selling overvalued stocks (see also Stein (1996) ). 2 Alternatively, managers could issue overvalued stocks and invest the proceeds in cash and interest-bearing securities ("zero-NPV projects").
However, this poses another problem: investors may burst the price bubble if they observe …rms allocating the proceeds from new issues into savings as opposed to capital acquisition. It follows that not only might bubbles in ‡uence …rm investment, but …rm investment might also in ‡uence bubbles.
This discussion highlights important di¢ culties in determining whether market misvaluation drives corporate investment. Firstly, value-maximizing managers might (optimally) respond to market mispricing by issuing equity and investing only if their …rms do not face the rational cost of capital; that is, if their …rms are otherwise "…nancially constrained." Secondly, one must recognize that …rm investment and valuation might be endogenously determined when equity is mispriced.
Unfortunately, studies on the real e¤ects of market valuation often fail to distinguish between …rms with and without rational demand for investment and, just as importantly, pursue testing strategies that overlook relevant simultaneity concerns. This paper examines the impact of market (mis)valuation on corporate behavior in a way that sidesteps the di¢ culties just noted. To accomplish this, we exploit …rm heterogeneity in tests that combine intertemporal and cross-sectional contrasts. In essence we ask: When is mispricing most likely to a¤ect …rm policies and which …rms are most likely to respond to mispricing? By contrasting various managerial decisions (investment, issuance, and savings) across …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms, across di¤erent sectors of the economy, in and out of bubbles, our tests address concerns about identi…cation and endogeneity, in the process of uncovering new results on the e¤ect of equity valuation on corporate behavior.
We use the late 1990's "tech bubble" as a laboratory in which to implement our tests. 3 In the context of that bubble, one might like to determine if tech …rms' policies were consistent with a drive to take advantage of irrationally high stock prices. Unfortunately, this is di¢ cult to ascertain.
In the tech sector, equity prices and investment levels might seem high ex post. Yet both might be explained by unobserved, technology-driven revisions of expected pro…tability occurring at that time (see Pastor and Veronesi (2006) ) -little can be said about a causal link between prices and investment in that sector. What is unique about the late 1990's is that the rise in technology stocks fueled a run-up in equity prices in other (non-tech) sectors of the economy (see Brooks and Katsaris 2 Stein provides a novel treatment of the con ‡icting incentives that managers have when deciding whether to sell overvalued stocks. According to his theory, managers that face short-term (long-term) time horizons are more (less) inclined to sell stocks at prices that do not re ‡ect …rm fundamentals. Stein also considers the e¤ect of …nancing frictions on the propensity to issue stock in the face of mispricing. Our results are consistent with this dimension of his theory. 3 While it is inherently di¢ cult to identify bubbles, various studies either assume or conclude that a bubble occurred around that period (e.g., Ofek and Richardson (2003) , Brunnemeier and Nagel (2004) , and Gri¢ n et al. (2006)). To simplify the language, we refer to the price run-up in the tech sector during the late 1990's as the "tech bubble." 0 1 /1 9 9 0 0 1 /1 9 9 1 0 1 /1 9 9 2 0 1 /1 9 9 3 0 1 /1 9 9 4 0 1 /1 9 9 5 0 1 /1 9 9 6 0 1 /1 9 9 7 0 1 /1 9 9 8 0 1 /1 9 9 9 0 1 /2 0 0 0 0 1 /2 0 0 1 0 1 /2 0 0 2 0 1 /2 0 0 3 DJI NASDAQ Composite Industrial Production Index The run-up in the Dow Jones Index is interesting for our purposes in that virtually all …rms in that index (mostly manufacturers) were, ex ante, not viewed as part of the technological revolution of the late 1990's -the Dow …rms were quickly dubbed "old economy …rms"as the NASDAQ rose.
Indeed, research on factor productivity conducted at that time stressed that traditional manufacturers did not (nor were they expected to) signi…cantly bene…t from the innovations introduced by the tech …rms (see Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) , Gordon (2000) , and Stiroh (2002) ). Yet, as we discuss later, their valuation appears to be in ‡uenced by the tech bubble. One potential explanation for this valuation "comovement" is that market participants (e.g., investors and …nancial analysts) became overoptimistic about equity investments -new and old economy stocks. Another is that traditional arbitrageurs, such as hedge funds, chose to ride the tech bubble (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Gri¢ n et al. (2006)) and were unwilling or unable to commit funds to smaller arbitrage opportunities in non-tech sectors (Morck et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ). 4 Our study does not take a stand on the mechanism behind cross-sector price e¤ects during the late 1990's. However, the context in which those e¤ects take place help us develop our test strategy. As a …rst cut at the data, rather than looking at tech …rms, we study the consequences of security (mis)valuation for non-tech manufacturers during the tech bubble; i.e., we look at those …rms whose 'business fundamentals'(deep technological parameters) observe no signi…cant changes in the late 1990's. Besides minimizing concerns that shifts in fundamentals could explain our …ndings, by focusing on the policies of non-bubble …rms we sidestep the problem of endogeneity between misvaluation and …rm decisions -it is hard to argue that non-tech manufacturers' policies could burst the tech-led bubble. As a second cut, within non-bubble …rms, we discriminate between those …rms that ordinarily face a wedge between the cost of external funds and the marginal product of investment (…nancially constrained …rms) and those that do not (…nancially unconstrained …rms). As we compare …rms that are likely to have excess demand for investment with those that do not, we are able to gauge whether …rms act on mispricing when doing so is consistent with optimizing behavior. 5;6
We design our tests to allow for direct comparisons with previous research (e.g., Blanchard et al. (1993) and Goyal and Yamada (2004) ). Our baseline test consists of regressing …rm investment on (1) a standard proxy for …rm market value (denoted Q M kt ) and (2) the projection of …rm market value on …rm and industry "fundamentals," such as past pro…tability and sales growth (denoted FundQ).
The basic idea behind our proposed speci…cation is that once one expunges publicly-available information about capital productivity (FundQ) from market prices (Q M kt ), the remainder should have no explanatory power over …rm investment, unless misvaluation a¤ects …rm decisions. As we discuss below, it is di¢ cult to articulate a story based on alternative economic rationales (or empirical biases) capable of explaining our …ndings. The paper's main results can be summarized as follows.
Using a large sample of non-tech manufacturers over the 1971-2003 period, we …rst estimate standard investment models where investment is regressed on Q M kt and cash ‡ow. These initial regressions suggest that Q M kt in ‡uences the investment of both …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms, with a stronger impact on constrained …rms. We then include FundQ in the regressions. This renders Q M kt insigni…cant. Consistent with standard theory, FundQ is strongly positive and has the same impact on investment across constrained and unconstrained …rms, suggesting that business fundamentals explain investment spending equally well across di¤erent types of …rms. These results are not consistent with the idea that market mispricing (as measured by Q M kt in our speci…cation) drives 5 We use a series of standard approaches to split our sample into …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms; these are based on observable …rm characteristics such as payout policy, size, and debt ratings. We also use a switching regression approach in which the probability that …rms face …nancial constraints is endogenously determined with investment.
6 Baker et al. (2003) also explore …rm contrasts to tease out the e¤ect misvaluation on investment (see also Polk and Sapienza (2003) ). Baker et al. split …rms according to a measure of "equity dependence" (the KZ Index, based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ) and …nd that Q M kt drives the investment of equity dependent …rms. Although we do not use the KZ Index, our base tests build on Baker et al. It is important to highlight that an equity dependent …rm is seen in their analysis as a …rm with low cash holdings, high leverage, and low pro…tability. In sharp contrast, the empirical characterization of a …nancially constrained …rm in our analysis (similar to Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2007) ) points to a …rm with high cash, low leverage, and high pro…tability. corporate investment on average. However, our regressions do not shed light on valuation-investment dynamics when mispricing is likely to be su¢ ciently acute and persistent to in ‡uence corporate policies. Similar to previous studies, by averaging out time variation in the panel estimation, our initial tests fail to highlight the impact of mispricing on corporate decisions during those periods when the case for exogenous variation in equity valuation is most plausible (i.e., during bubbles).
A subsequent set of tests reveals what happens during bubbles. We add to our baseline model a dummy variable for the tech bubble period and an interaction term between that dummy and Q M kt . 7 The results point to a signi…cant change in the way …rms respond to mispricing. In particular, we …nd that while the non-fundamental component of prices has no e¤ ect on the investment of unconstrained non-tech manufacturers, the e¤ect of mispricing on the investment of constrained non-tech manufacturers is positive and strong during the tech bubble. Our most conservative estimates imply that, during the bubble, for every one standard deviation increase in the non-fundamental component of market valuation, a constrained non-tech manufacturer's capital stock increases by 1:3% per year. Our results are novel in showing that price run-ups in one sector may improve corporate welfare in other sectors by easing constraints on the investment funding of credit-rationed …rms -this without leading to wasteful overinvestment by …rms that have easier access to fairly-priced funds.
More broadly, our …ndings are consistent with recent macroeconomic theories suggesting that stock market booms shift investment spending towards …nancially constrained …rms, stimulating corporate sector growth (see Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and Caballero et al. (2006) ).
While the results discussed thus far imply the existence of a link between mispricing and investment, they do not show how mispricing a¤ects investment. For instance, one could argue that our …nding that Q M kt picks up signi…cance over the bubble period may arise from concerns that the ability of FundQ to summarize fundamentals might have declined towards the end of our sample period. 8 To further characterize our claims and di¤erentiate our …ndings from competing explanations, we turn to the identi…cation of the mechanism through which stock mispricing a¤ects …rm investment.
Recall, the argument we consider suggests that …rms might take advantage of mispricing by issuing stock and investing the proceeds. This implies that we should observe issuance activity increasing in tandem with investment during the bubble. Accordingly, we look at whether market valuation (Q M kt ) drives issuance over and above what is implied by the attractiveness of investment (FundQ) among non-tech manufacturers in the late 1990's. Con…rming the logic of our story, we …nd that …nan-cially constrained …rms in non-tech sectors issue more in response to mispricing during the tech bubble, while unconstrained …rms in those same sectors do not. This …nding is relevant because it casts doubt on the argument that investment and valuation might be correlated simply because valuation 7 Alternatively, we use the NASDAQ Index as our proxy for the tech bubble. 8 Of course, if this story was true, then we should see a higher coe¢ cient for Q M kt during the bubble period for both constrained and unconstrained manufacturers, but this is not what we …nd (more on this below).
gives market signals about the pro…tability of investment to managers -this argument implies that the stock market may not play a role in allocating funds (Dow and Gorton (1997) ). In e¤ect, we show that there exists an active …nancing channel underlying the link between valuation and investment.
Finally, notice that our test strategy relies on the assumption that tech …rms and non-tech manufacturers di¤er in fundamental ways -they operate in di¤erent business paradigms. However, tech …rms, just like constrained non-tech manufacturers, are typically small, pay no dividends, and have no credit ratings. One potential concern is that the investment and issuance behavior that we have documented for constrained manufacturers over the bubble might also be found in tech …rms. Such similarities could call our inferences into question. Fortunately, the literature points to additional margins in which to explore our identi…cation strategy in order to substantiate our conclusions. According to Blanchard et al. (1993) , a …rm whose capital stock gives rise to a pricing bubble should channel the proceeds from stock issuance towards new investment, away from cash and liquid securities -investors may burst the bubble if they observe these …rms hoarding cash instead of investing.
In contrast, recent work on the …nancial policy of constrained …rms (e.g., Almeida et al. (2004)) suggests that these …rms will allocate cash in ‡ows towards holdings of cash and liquid securitiesconstrained …rms not only use funds for current investment, but also save, as internal savings allow them to invest more in the future (when investment might be more pro…table).
To test these predictions, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations explaining spending and savings at the …rm level. Results from these estimations reveal distinctive patterns in the allocation of funds across bubble …rms and constrained non-bubble …rms in the late 1990's. Firms whose actions in ‡uence the bubble (tech …rms) do not allocate funds from issuance proceeds into cash savings during the bubble; instead, those funds are geared towards investment. In contrast, constrained non-bubble …rms channel the issuance proceeds towards both investment and cash savings. 9 These results are new to the literature, which until now has largely ignored the impact of mispricing on …rm …nancial policies, such as cash savings behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss our testing strategy, describe the data selection, and characterize our empirical speci…cations. Section 3 reports our results on …rm investment, issuance, and savings policies over the tech bubble. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Strategy
We …rst discuss how we select …rms that …t our identi…cation strategy and describe our data. Subsequently, we introduce our baseline empirical model. 9 That constrained manufacturers seem to trade o¤ the ability of investing in the late 1990's and in future years agrees with the notion that they did not overinvest during the tech bubble (when investment was not particularly attractive).
Non-Bubble Sectors During the Tech Bubble
To implement our strategy, we seek to identify a price "run-up" or "bubble" in the market for corporate securities. We propose that one event …tting this requirement is the late 1990's tech-fueled price run-up in the major U.S. equity markets. Arguably, that phenomenon was borne out of investors'inability to gauge the marginal product of a particular set of new business technologies. For our purposes, the notable observation is that the run-up in tech stocks was mirrored -albeit on a smaller scale -in other sectors. Importantly, some of those other sectors were ex ante perceived as being outside of the tech paradigm. Our hypothesis is that the observed price run-up in those sectors were not driven by fundamentals, but derived from a contagion-type e¤ect.
We …rst identify industrial sectors whose business fundamentals were likely not directly a¤ected by the advances in telecommunications and data processing of the late 1990's (we call those sectors the "non-bubble sectors"). We then check if time series data on equity valuation (P/E ratios and Qs) and business fundamentals (employment, product prices, sales, and pro…tability) from non-bubble sectors are consistent with our hypothesis that the market valuation of those sectors spiked, while fundamentals stayed constant (at historical trend levels), during the tech bubble period.
Identifying Non-Bubble Sectors
At the onset of the late 1990's wave of innovations in telecommunications, software making, and data storage and processing, a number of industrial segments were referred to as "old economy" sectors.
By and large, these sectors'modi operandi were perceived to be unaltered by the technological innovations of that time. Industries falling in this category comprise an important fraction of the U.S. economy (examples are energy, steel, mining, chemicals, paper, food, and tobacco). As a …rst step, we look at manufacturing industries to identify non-bubble sectors (this choice is in ‡uenced by our priors and by the availability of detailed data on these industries). We recognize, however, that a number of manufacturing industries either introduced or demanded technologies that were related to the innovations of the late 1990's (see, e.g., Bond and Cummins (2000) and Stiroh (2002) ). Following Bond and Cummins, we classify …rms operating in SICs 355, 357, 366, 367, 369, 381, 382 , and 384 as "technology-related" manufacturers. 10 These industries should absorb most of the spillover e¤ects of the technological advances of the 1990's going into the manufacturing sector.
As an extra step, we pool together the remaining manufacturing SICs and examine whether those industries'inputs come from technology and technology-related manufacturing sectors. To do this, we look at the Bureau of Economic Analysis's Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for 1997 and compute, for each of the manufacturing industries in the U.S., the proportion of inputs that come from tech industries (SICs 481 and 737) as well as tech-related manufacturing industries (de…ned just above).
Acting conservatively, we then drop from our sample of non-bubble sectors any industries for which inputs from tech and tech-related industries contribute more than one cent to each dollar of output sold ("tech consumers"). Likewise, we discard any industries whose output contributes with more than one cent to each dollar of output sold by tech industries ("tech suppliers"). In all, these discarded industries comprise SICs 227, 229, 348, 351, 361, 362, 365, 371, 372, 376, 379, 385, and 386. 11 Finally, out of the remaining SICs, we look for those industries whose product marketing and sales -as opposed to production -might have been a¤ected by advances in communication (e.g., online marketing). Using some judgment, we put in this category producers of apparel and textile goods (SICs 232, 233, 234, and 236) , book printing and publishing (SIC 273), household appliance manufacturers (SIC 363), and toy and sports goods producers (SIC 394) . 12 After all these screens, we are left with 113 3-digit manufacturing SICs, which we call "non-bubble manufacturers."
Valuation and Fundamentals of Non-Bubble Firms over the Bubble Period
We hypothesize that non-bubble manufacturers did not observe signi…cant changes in their activities over the 1990's tech bubble, but that those …rms' market values may have increased relative to fundamentals in that period. In this section, we discuss the existing literature on cross-sectoral valuation and productivity e¤ects, o¤ering graphical evidence in support of our working hypothesis.
Valuation There is limited research on the valuation spillover e¤ects of the technology bubble. Brooks and Katsaris (2005a) show evidence of valuation contagion e¤ects going from the technology sector to a subset of S&P 500 sector indices (including industrials, materials, and energy). Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) further describe trading rules based on probabilities of rallies and crashes in di¤erent sectors that lead to valuation spillover e¤ects. They discuss pro…table strategies in which investors sell stocks in sectors where the probability of a price collapse is high and buy stocks in sectors where bubbles are in their initial stages, fueling the spread of bubbles across sectors. The …ndings of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Gri¢ n et al. (2006) suggest that the strategies pursued by hedge funds and large institutional investors fueled the tech bubble, sustaining it for a number of years over the late 1990's. The evidence in these papers is consistent with the scenario in which Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) "limits of arbitrage"allow for cross-sectoral price spillover e¤ects. 1 1 These SICs correspond, respectively, to carpets and rugs, miscellaneous textile goods, ordnance and accessories, engines and turbines, audio and video equipment, motor vehicles and equipment, aircrafts and parts, guided missiles and space vehicles parts, miscellaneous transportation equipment, ophthalmic goods, and photographic equipment.
1 2 We also obtain data on …rms that launch commercial websites during the 1994-1999 period (we thank Eliezer Fich for sharing his data). Very few industries in our …nal sample have more than a handful of …rms launching websites during that period. Seven …rms in SIC 382 (drugs) and three in SIC 331 (steel works) launch websites. We chose to keep these industries in the tests performed below, but results are unchanged if we eliminate both SICs from our sample. 1.80 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 3.60 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 Year Raw Median P/E Ratio HP-Filtered Median P/E Ratio trading facilitated market participation and diversi…cation. 13 As Poterba (1998) and Heaton and Lucas (1999) suggest, while experienced investors were wealthier and more risk-tolerant, newcomers in the 1990's were young wage-earners who tended to be much more risk-averse, likely investing their life savings in traditional (non-tech) sectors such as energy, chemicals, transportation, etc.
A full-blown analysis of spillover price e¤ects during bubbles is beyond the scope of our paper.
Notably, we …nd that virtually all of the SICs we label "non-bubble" are assigned to sector indices that Brooks and Katsaris (2005a) identify as experiencing a tech-fueled price run-up. While we don't replicate those authors' methods here, we examine whether non-bubble manufacturers' market values rose above their historical trend during the late 1990's technology bubble. To do so, we compute the median price-earnings ratio (P/E ) and median market-to-book ratio (Q) for those …rms in COMPUSTAT that operate in non-bubble manufacturing industries (as de…ned in Section 2.1.1) over the 1970-2003 period. We then subject those series to a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) [HP] decomposition, isolating their trend and transitory components. 14 We plot the raw and the HP-transitory valuation series in Figure 2 .
Panels A and B of Figure 2 suggest that non-tech manufacturers'P/E ratios and Qs soared above their historical trends in the second half of the 1990's. These value series reverted back (sharply) to their trend levels in 2000, and hovered below trend in subsequent years. These unprecedented value deviations in the non-tech manufacturing sector seem to closely mirror the rise and fall of tech stocks.
Fundamentals Next, we consider the business fundamentals of non-bubble manufacturers. One could argue that innovations in telecommunications and data processing are likely to have far-reaching consequences for …rm productivity, as they could a¤ect not only production processes, but also managerial methods, systems monitoring and logistics, corporate organization, and other intangible aspects of the …rm (see Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) ). Research on factor productivity, however, suggests that productivity gains in non-bubble sectors were not signi…cant during the late 1990's (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) , Gordon (2000) , and Stiroh (2002)). More concretely, there were no noticeable shifts in productivity ("productivity acceleration") in that period for most manufacturers, but rather declines outside of the durable goods segment (where computer makers are included). Indeed, researchers are at odds as to whether gains from the technological advances of the late 1990's will ever bear fruit in older manufacturing segments (see Gordon) .
We look at industry-and …rm-level data on employment, prices, sales, and pro…tability over the last three decades to check whether these fundamental indicators change around the 1990's tech bubble. We treat these series in the same way we treated the valuation series examined above;
i.e., we compile time series measures of centrality for the raw data and subject them to a HodrickPrescott decomposition. The goal is to gauge whether movements in these series could help explain the apparent increase in the valuation of non-bubble manufacturers'stocks during the late 1990's. 1.50 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 2.00 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 6.00 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 Year Raw Median Profitability HP-Filtered Median Profitability These series fail to reveal any indication of fundamental changes in production and/or pro…tabil-ity of the manufacturing industries that we identify as non-bubble during the late 1990's. Simply put, data from business fundamentals (in Figure 3 ) o¤er no obvious explanation for the stock price run-up of the non-tech manufacturing sector during the tech bubble ( Figure 2 ).
Firm Selection Criteria
Our main analyses use …rm-level data. For the tests performed in this paper, we consider a sample of …rms taken from COMPUSTAT's P/S/T, Full Coverage, and Research annual …les over the 1971-2003 period. We require …rms to provide valid information on total assets, sales, market capitalization, cash holdings, operating income, capital expenditures, and plant, property and equipment (…xed capital). We de ‡ate all series to 1971 dollars.
Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach largely follows that of Baker et al. (2003) , who look at the impact of equity prices on …rm investment, and that of Almeida et al. (2004) , who study the impact of …nancial constraints on savings policy. Similar to Almeida et al., we discard those …rm-years displaying asset or sales growth exceeding 100% -large jumps in business fundamentals usually indicate major corporate events, such as mergers. Likewise, we also discard …rms with annual capital expenditures exceeding 100% of the beginning-of-period capital base. Based on Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Almeida and Campello (2006) , we eliminate …rm-years for which …xed capital is less than $5 million and for which the ratio of market value to book value of assets, or Q, exceeds 10. Those studies argue that linear investment spending models are inadequate for …rms with very little capital in place and for which Q is likely to be grossly mismeasured. Finally, as we also look at issuance behavior, we also exclude IPO …rm-years and …rm-years issuing equity in excess of 200% of their beginning-of-period equity stock.
A total of 1,943 individual …rms in non-bubble manufacturing sectors remain after our basic data screens. Some of our variables require up to three lags of data, and our …nal sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 14,055 observations. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our main tests. Since our sampling approach follows the literature, it is not surprising that the numbers we report in Table 1 resemble those found in related studies (e.g., Almeida et al. (2004) ).
In the interest of brevity, we omit discussion of the sample descriptive statistics. 
Financially Constrained and Financially Unconstrained Firms
Our tests require splitting …rms according to measures of …nancing constraints. There are many plausible approaches to sorting …rms into …nancially "constrained" and "unconstrained" categories.
Since we do not have strong priors about which approach is best, we adopt multiple alternative schemes to categorize the …rms in our sample.
Our basic approach is to follow the standard literature, using ex-ante …nancial constraint sortings that are based on …rm observables, such as, payout policy, size, and debt ratings. In particular we adopt the sortings schemes discussed in Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2007) :
Scheme #1: In every year over the 1971-2003 period we rank …rms based on their payout ratio and assign to the …nancially constrained (unconstrained) category those …rms in the bottom (top) three deciles of the payout distribution. We compute the payout ratio as the ratio of total distributions (dividends plus stock repurchases) to assets. 15 The intuition that …nancially constrained …rms have lower payout follows from Fazzari et al. (1988) , who argue that reluctance to distribute funds is caused by a wedge between the costs of internal and external …nancing. basis. This approach resembles Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Erickson and Whited (2000) , who distinguish groups of …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms on the basis of size. The argument for size as a good measure of …nancial constraints is that small …rms are typically young and less well known, and thus more likely to face capital market frictions.
Scheme #3: We retrieve data on …rms' bond ratings and categorize those …rms that never had their public debt rated during our sample period as …nancially constrained. Given that unconstrained …rms may choose not to use debt …nancing and hence not obtain a debt rating, we only assign to the constrained subsample those …rm-years that both lack a rating and report positive debt (see Faulkender and Petersen (2006) ). 16 Financially unconstrained …rms are those whose bonds have been rated during the sample period. Related approaches for characterizing …nancial constraints are used by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) and Cummins et al. (2006) .
The advantage of this measure of constraints over the former two is that it gauges the market's assessment of a …rm's credit quality. The same rationale applies to the next measure.
Scheme #4: We retrieve data on …rms'commercial paper ratings and categorize as …nancially constrained those …rms that never display any ratings during our sample period. Observations from those …rms are only assigned to the constrained subsample in years in which positive debt is reported. Firms that issued rated commercial paper at some point during the sample period are considered unconstrained. This approach follows from the work of Calomiris et al. (1995) on the characteristics of commercial paper issuers. Table 2 reports the number of …rm-years under each of the …nancial constraint categories used in our analysis. According to the payout scheme, for example, there are 4,232 …nancially constrained …rm-years and 4,231 …nancially unconstrained …rm-years. The table also shows the extent to which the four classi…cation schemes are related. For example, out of the 4,232 …rm-years classi…ed as constrained according to the payout scheme, 2,017 are also constrained according to the size scheme, while a much smaller fraction, 509 …rm-years, are classi…ed as unconstrained. The remaining …rm-years represent payout-constrained …rms that are neither constrained nor unconstrained according to size. In general, there is a positive association among the four measures of …nancial constraints.
For example, most small (large) …rms lack (have) bond ratings. Also, most small (large) …rms make low (high) payouts. However, the table also makes it clear that these cross-group correlations are far from perfect. This works against our tests …nding consistent results across all classi…cation schemes. Table 2 about here 1 6 Firms with no bond ratings and no debt are not considered constrained, but our results are una¤ected by how we treat these …rms. We use the same approach for …rms with no commercial paper ratings and no debt in Scheme #4 below.
One potential drawback of the ex-ante sorting approach described above is that it does not allow the investment process to work as a determinant of the …nancial constraint status -the constraint categorization is exogenously given. In turn, we also use an alternative categorization approach that endogenizes the constraint status together with other variables in a structural model. The approach, borrowed from Almeida and Campello (2006) , uses a switching regression model with unknown sample separation to estimate investment regressions. One advantage of this estimator is that we can simultaneously use all of the above sorting information (dividend policy, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings) together with other information (such as …rm value and cash ‡ows) to categorize …rms. Almeida and Campello provide a detailed description of the switching regression estimator (see also Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) ). Here we give a brief summary of the methodology.
Assume that there are two di¤erent investment regimes, which we denote by "regime 1" and "regime 2." While the number of investment regimes is given, the points of structural change are not observable and are estimated together with the investment equations. The model is composed of the following system of equations (estimated simultaneously):
(1)
Eqs.
(1) and (2) are the structural equations of the system; they are essentially two di¤erent versions of our baseline investment model, Eq. (5) below. Let X it be the vector of explanatory variables, and be the vector of coe¢ cients that relates the variables in X to investment I 1it and I 2it . Di¤erential investment behavior across …rms in regime 1 and regime 2 is captured by di¤erences between 1 and 2 . Eq. (3) is the selection equation that establishes the …rm's likelihood of being in regime 1 or regime 2. The vector Z it contains the determinants of a …rm's propensity of being in either regime.
Observed investment is given by:
where y it is a latent variable that gauges the likelihood that the …rm is in the …rst or the second regime.
The parameters 1 , 2 , and are estimated via maximum likelihood. To estimate those parameters we assume that the error terms " 1 , " 2 , and u are jointly normally distributed. Critically, the estimator's covariance matrix allows for nonzero correlation between shocks to investment and shocks to …rms'characteristics -this makes the model we use an endogenous switching regression. 17 1 7 To be precise, the covariance matrix has the form = The extent to which investment spending di¤ers across the two regimes and the likelihood that …rms are assigned to either regime are simultaneously determined.
Finally, to identify the system we need to determine which regime is the constrained one and which regime is the unconstrained. The algorithm in Eqs. (1)- (4) creates two groups of …rms that di¤er according to their investment behavior, but it does not tell the econometrician which …rms are constrained. To achieve identi…cation, we need to use priors about …rm characteristics are associated with …nancial constraints. We do so, by utilizing the same four characteristics used in the ex-ante sortings (payout, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings).
All of the results we report below (derived from the traditional ex-ante categorization approach) also hold for the switching regression approach. To shorten the exposition, we only tabulate the results from the switching regression estimation of the main model in the paper. Results related to the initial steps of the analysis are readily available from the authors.
Baseline Model
Our baseline empirical model of the valuation-investment relation is both parsimonious and fairly standard. De…ne Investment as the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #128) to beginning-of-period capital stock (lagged item #8). Let Q Mkt , the proxy for market valuation, be computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #199 item #25) item #60 item #74) / (item #6). CashFlow is gross operating income minus interest, taxes, and dividend payments (item #13 -item #15 -item #16 -item #19 -item #21) divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock.
Finally, de…ne FundQ as the projection of Q Mkt on factors that capture information about the pro…tability of the …rm's capital -FundQ can be seen as a compact representation of the component of market valuation that is explained by publicly observed data on capital productivity. The literature has traditionally looked at pro…ts, investment spending, and sales growth as likely sources of information about the marginal product of capital. 18 In computing FundQ, we use two lags of all of these variables. In addition, we complement our information set with …rm …nancial data: two lags of the liquid-to-total assets ratio (liquidity), debt-to-asset ratio (leverage), and market value (capitalization). We go a step further and complement …rm-level information with variables that convey information about industry conditions: two lags of industry sales growth, capital investment growth, and R&D spending growth. 19 1 8 Examples are Barro (1990) , Blundell et al. (1992) , Blanchard et al. (1993) , Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1994) , and Goyal and Yamada (2004) .
1 9 All of the variables included in our FundQ regression model return sensible, statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients with the exception of the lags of industry R&D spending. Since the estimation of the FundQ model is not particularly revealing, we omit the regression output (the tabulated results are readily available). The FundQ regression's adjusted-R 2 is 30%.
Our baseline model has the following form:
where …rm and year capture …rm-and year-speci…c e¤ects, respectively. 20 Our regressions correct the error structure in Eq. (5) for heteroskedasticity using the White-Huber variance estimator.
We must be precise about our de…nition of mispricing. In our tests, this will refer to the component of prices that is not related to information on …rm fundamentals. In particular, much of our focus is on the coe¢ cient returned for Q Mkt in the presence of FundQ, cf. Eq. (5). One concern is that if investors optimistically (over-)react to that information then our FundQ measure could contain what one could call mispricing. Work by Lakonishok et al. (1994) shows that this problem could be pronounced in particular …rm-years (e.g., "glamour …rms"observing pronounced sales growth). Since we …t the FundQ regression for our entire panel -forcing a "one-size-…ts-all"loading on fundamentals -concerns that our FundQ measure can be systematically in ‡uenced by investor over-reaction to news from select groups of …rm-years become less compelling. Also, note that our strategy implies a basic measure of price fundamentals: a linear extrapolation from publicly available information.
One concern is that investors might use more sophisticated (non-linear) models of fundamentals to form prices. In this case, our FundQ proxy may fail to properly summarize priced fundamentals. In unreported tests, we address this concern by introducing additional log and quadratic terms of …rm and industry information in our FundQ regression. This does not alter our inferences.
One potential limitation of our approach is the use of past data to proxy for the pro…tability of the marginal investment. In the robustness section, we follow Cummins et al. (2006) and use …nancial analysts' forecasts of …rm pro…tability to compute FundQ. In addition, we also perform tests in which FundQ is computed with future realizations of the variables listed above. All results survive these alternative tests. It is therefore hard to argue that the use of expectations about the future would lead to di¤erent results in our tests, unless these are neither re ‡ected in estimates made by …nancial analysts nor fall, on average, close to observed outcomes.
Before turning to the empirical section, we note that one could wonder if a more direct approach 2 0 We use contemporaneous investment and Q in Eq. (5) following the standard empirical implementation of the Q -theory (see Hayashi (1982) ) and extensions that account for the impact of …nancial constraints (e.g., Fazzari et al. (1988) and Cummins et al. (2006) ). One could consider the use lagged Q, but this is sometimes less than ideal. The theory implies that the …rm should invest in lock-step with changes in Q at low frequencies (annual data). The introduction of arbitrary lags in this relation may lead to misspeci…cation. For instance, suppose that an increase in Q today is associated with higher investment today (as predicted by the theory). Since investing today can make future investment less productive (one can appeal to the concavity of the production function), tomorrow's investment may be lower, biasing downward the estimate of the relation between investment and (lagged) Q. One can also construct arguments suggesting an upward bias in the relation between investment and lagged Q (see Caballero and Leahy (1996) ). To verify that our inferences do not hinge on the lag structure of the investment model, we also experiment with the use of lagged Q and FundQ. This a¤ects some of our estimates, but brings no qualitative changes to our main conclusions. to our test is to run the following regression: 
while a preferred model was
The question is: Are the estimates returned for 1 and 1 di¤erent? No. Note that the estimate returned for 1 in Eq. (7) is equal to that of the following regression (see Greene (1993)):
where M P Q i;t is the same thing as
The reason why we use the approach of Eq. (7) is simply that it is easier to see how we add to the existing literature: all we do is to introduce one extra variable, FundQ, keeping intact all of the other variables of the standard investment equation.
Empirical Results

Market Valuation and Investment Spending
Base Tests
We start our analysis with results from a compact version of Eq. (5). This standard functional form for investment spending is based on the work on …nancial constraints initiated with Fazzari et al.
(1988) and recently used by Baker et al. (2003) :
The results we obtain from estimating Eq. (10) over partitions of …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms are reported in the proxy for the marginal productivity of investment, FundQ, dwarfs the impact of Q M kt , which becomes mostly negative for unconstrained …rms. The inclusion of the proxy for fundamentals boosts the explanatory power of the investment models (the regression R 2 ) by about one-third. In addition, the estimations return similar coe¢ cients for fundamentals (FundQ) for both …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms. 21 Table 4 about here
The results of Table 4 be explained by fundamentals, they do not imply that the non-fundamental component of prices never in ‡uences real …rm decisions (more on this shortly).
Robustness of the Base Tests
Before we proceed it is important that we check the robustness of the results in Table 4 (much of our subsequent analysis builds on it). The …rst concern one could raise is that entering FundQ in a standard investment regression might minimize the e¤ect of Q M kt simply because those two variables are collinear. In a way, we use FundQ as a matter of convenience -a single proxy that synthesizes priced information from a large set of variables re ‡ecting fundamentals. Our …ndings regarding Q M kt , if robust, should also hold if we were to enter our proxies for fundamentals (pro…ts, sales growth, etc.) directly in the regression, instead of FundQ. This is done under column 1 of Table   5 . While we omit the coe¢ cients of the 20 variables we use to capture fundamentals, it is clear that the impact of Q M kt on investment disappears once fundamentals are accounted for in a standard fashion. 22 Another concern with our statistical approach is that FundQ is a "constructed variable,"
hence the standard errors in Table 4 could be severely underestimated. We check whether this observation explains the signi…cance of FundQ by correcting the standard errors reported in Table 4 with the use of a full- ‡edge 2SLS estimator (i.e., the variance of the proxies for fundamentals are accounted for in the error structure of Eq. (5)). The results reported in column 2 of Table 5 dismiss this sort of concern with our original estimations. Finally, the OLS estimations of Table 4 may be biased to the extent that the regressors are correlated with the error term. While this criticism can be leveled against virtually all studies in the literature, it is worth checking whether this is a major concern for our inferences (particularly because we use current-period right-hand side variables). In column 3 of Table 5 , we follow Cummins et al. (2006) , who look at a comparable model and adopt a GMM estimator featuring lags 3 and 4 of the dependent and independent variables of the regression as instruments. Except for the fact that the estimates associated with Q M kt become even smaller (more negative), we …nd no qualitative di¤erences when we use GMM to estimate Eq. (5). In all, these checks suggest that the baseline model of Table 4 leads to very consistent inferences. The results in Tables 4 and 5 imply that the component of market valuation that is not explained by fundamentals is, on average, of no consequence for …rm investment spending. Unfortunately, the design of those tests does not allow one to see how …rms respond to deviations from price fundamentals when they may matter the most: during market bubbles or run-ups. It is during those periods, 2 2 As an additional check of the collinearity story, for each of our estimations of Eq. (5) in Table 4 , we measured the variance in ‡ation factors (or VIFs) associated with Q M kt and FundQ. A VIF in excess of 10 should raise concerns about collinearity; however, the highest value of that statistic in our tests is only 1.6. one could argue, that mispricing might signi…cantly a¤ect investment.
A number of arguments support this notion. For example, rigidities in the investment process may require deviations from fundamentals to be large and su¢ ciently long-lived to in ‡uence managerial decisions in meaningful ways ("hysteresis"). 23 Moreover, …rms may be reluctant to liquidate capital when prices fall too much. In both cases, the strict linearity of our base tests may lead us to over-reject the misvaluation-investment channel. Alternatively, one could argue that managers would be prone to take advantage of misvaluation depending on the price elasticity of demand for new share issues.
If prices were to fall sharply as …rms try to take advantage of misvaluation (e.g., investors may back out managers' valuation of equity based on corporate issuance policies), then misvaluation should have no observable impact on investment. In contrast, if demand were to increase su¢ ciently so as to absorb new equity issues at relatively high prices, then …rms would be able to capitalize on mispricing if they so desired. 24 If bubbles are characterized by a higher ability of …rms to take advantage of misvaluation (e.g., arbitrageurs are unable or unwilling to act on mispricing à la Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ), then our base analysis may lack power to detect the impact of misvaluation on investment.
In sum, one could argue that experiments designed in the spirit of our base tests might fail to capture any impact of (mis)valuation on investment simply because …rms may not generally respond to small, short-lived price movements that can not be exploited. Fortunately, it is easy to modify our model to investigate this argument.
The Impact of Bubbles on the Valuation-Investment Channel
We now examine the e¤ect of the non-fundamental component of market valuation on investment over a period of perceived widespread mispricing. To do this, we consider the tech-led bubble of the late 1990's, focusing on non-tech ("non-bubble") manufacturers. We further discriminate between those …rms for which investment demand is typically constrained by …nancing imperfections and those that are likely to …nd competitively-priced funding for their investments. In other words, we again di¤erentiate between …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms.
Our strategy is straightforward. For non-tech manufacturing …rms, we gauge the impact of the non-fundamental component of market values during the technology bubble (i.e., the impact of Q M kt in the presence of FundQ) by entering in our baseline speci…cation (Eq. (5)) a dummy variable for the 1995-1999 period (Bubble) and an interaction term for that dummy and Q M kt . 25 Since we add 2 3 As a rough test of the idea that adjustment costs may create rigidities in the way investment respond to mispricing, we re-estimate Eq. (5) conditional on the ratio of …xed assets to total assets; with the premise that those adjustment costs may be lower for …rms that employ less …xed capital. As it turns out, we …nd that Q M kt attracts a marginally positive coe¢ cient for constrained …rms whose ratio of …xed-to-total assets is below the sample median.
2 4 Formally, Gilchrist et al. (2005) advance a model in which …rms capitalize on bubbles. In their model, …rm issuance activity drive down equity prices, yet it may not totally eliminate mispricing.
2 5 In isolating the e¤ects of the late 1990's bubble, the last …rm …scal year we consider from COMPUSTAT is 1999. We do so because …scal-year 2000 incorporates the bubble burst for most …rms. We set the beginning of our the Bubble dummy, we drop the year dummies from Eq. (5) and model within-year error dependence using year clustering (see Rogers (1993) ); errors are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. The resulting model can be written as follows:
M kt i;t + 2 F undQ i;t + 3 CashF low i;t (11)
Our focus is on whether the tech-driven bubble had a valuation e¤ect upon the manufacturing sector; an e¤ect that was dissociated from fundamentals and whose magnitude was signi…cant. Accordingly, if manufacturers responded to that positive value innovation, the estimation of Eq. (11) should return a positive signi…cant coe¢ cient for 5 . Crucially, a positive response to overvaluation in this setting would only be welfare-increasing if observed across …rms that normally face …nancing constraints -those that otherwise would not fund positive NPV projects. For one to conclude that the tech bubble allowed mispricing to drive up investment, the sum of 1 and 5 has to be positive and signi…cant. Our discussion emphasizes both of those coe¢ cients.
The results from the estimation of Eq. (11) are reported in Table 6 . The estimates shown in the table are robust and consistent across all of the sample partitions. They imply that the impact of mispricing on the investment of constrained …rms was quite pronounced during the tech bubble period, but not outside of that period. For constrained …rms, 1 is insigni…cant, while 5 is positive and statistically signi…cant. Moreover, the impact of market valuation during the bubble ( 1 + 5 ) is positive and statistically signi…cant at better than the 5% test level across all constrained partitions.
These results contrast sharply with those returned for …nancially unconstrained …rms. The bubble has no impact on the relation between valuation and investment for unconstrained …rms ( 5 ' 0). Indeed, a negative relation between mispricing and investment emerges in unconstrained samples (as 1 < 0);
however, that relation is economically small. Crucially, we can reject with better than 99% con…dence the hypothesis that the sensitivity of investment to mispricing is the same across constrained and unconstrained …rms during the tech bubble (i.e., constrained ( 1 + 5 ) > unconstrained ( 1 + 5 )).
At the same time, for most partitions, that sensitivity is statistically similar across those two types of …rms in the non-bubble period (or, constrained 1 ' unconstrained 1 ). Table 6 about here run-up window in 1995 because this is the …rst year when the majority of manufacturing …rms in our sample register Q M kt s that are signi…cantly above their long-run trend (see Panel B of Figure 2 ). From 1995 to 1999, the S&P500 returns were 27, 21, 22, 25, and 12%, respectively. As highlighted by White (2006) , this long series of high returns is extraordinary, and likely characterizes a "market boom" if one considers that the unconditional probability of observing four consecutive years of returns in excess of 20% is only 0.004. Our results also obtain if we alternatively take 1994 or 1996 as starting points; they become naturally weaker as we move away from that window. In later tests, we use changes in the NASDAQ Index as our bubble proxy.
To illustrate the economic meaning of our coe¢ cients, we consider the most conservative estimate of the marginal e¤ect of Q M kt on the investment of constrained non-tech manufacturers during the tech bubble (based on commercial paper ratings; see row 4 of Table 6 ). For those …rms, our results imply that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of market to book value (Q M kt ) that is not spanned by fundamentals (FundQ) leads to an increase in the yearly ratio of investment to capital stock of 0.013, which is about 6.3% of the sample mean investment rate, or 2.4% of the sample mean total asset base (see Table 1 ). These magnitudes are notable, even though they are likely to underestimate the economic impact of bubbles on the valuation-investment channel for the average constrained manufacturer, who invests at the same rate of the average sample …rm but has a much smaller asset base. 26 In all, our estimates suggest that, during the tech bubble, variation in non-fundamental valuation allowed for new investment spending by non-bubble manufacturers facing …nancing constraints. In other words, run-up in equity prices allowed for positive NPV projects to be undertaken by these …rms -projects that otherwise would go unfunded. In contrast, such an investment-(mis)valuation relation is not observed for …rms that need not take advantage of irrationally high prices (…nancially unconstrained manufacturers). In particular, the relation between unconstrained manufacturers'investment and the non-fundamental component of equity values was una¤ected by the bubble. These results imply that market overvaluation may ease the …nancing di¢ culties faced by credit-constrained …rms -hence improving investment e¢ ciency -without leading to wasteful overinvestment by …rms that have access to fairly-priced funds. Put di¤erently, our results suggest that what can be characterized as market pricing ine¢ ciencies may have positive externalities across di¤erent sectors of the economy. These …ndings on corporate welfare have potentially important implications for economic policy-making (see Jermann and Quadrini (2006) ) and point to a promising path for future research.
Robustness of the Valuation-Investment Channel During Bubbles
We perform a series of robustness checks regarding our paper's central …ndings. We preset those checks under three general categories.
Speci…cation Issues While our results are robust across …rm partitions, one could argue that they might arise from the simple, parsimonious nature of our empirical speci…cation. Recent work by Erickson and Whited (2000) , Gomes (2001) , and Alti (2003) has attributed extant …ndings on the investment spending of …nancially constrained …rms to estimation biases stemming from misspeci…-2 6 Notice that although Bubble attracts a negative coe¢ cient ( 4), in order for investment to drop during the bubble, Q M kt has to be lower than 1 (since 4 ' 5). As one can see from Table 1 , however, the mean (standard deviation) of Q M kt is 1.363 (0.813). Clearly, at the mean level, a one standard deviation increase in Q M kt more than o¤sets the impact of the coe¢ cient associated with 4. The same is true even at the lowest level of empirical Q M kt (equal to 0.345).
Residuals for FundQ : Constrained Firms -0.10 0.00 0.10 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 Alternatively, one might argue that our inferences about the impact of mispricing during the bubble could arise from changes in our model's ability to forecast business fundamentals -hence investment demand -during bubbles. In particular, one could argue that Q M kt displays a comparatively greater explanatory power over investment in the 1995-1999 period (as we document) simply because of a possible decline in the ability of FundQ to summarize business fundamentals towards the end of our sample. Clearly, if this story was true, then we should see a higher coe¢ cient for Q M kt during the bubble period for both constrained and unconstrained …rms. This pattern does not obtain in the data (see Table 6 ). Yet, a simple way to check if the forecasting power of FundQ weakens over the 1995-1999 period is to look at the yearly residuals of a regression of Investment on FundQ over our sample period. Those yearly residuals are captured by the inclusion of year dummies in that regression. A plot of the residuals from each of our constrained sample regressions is displayed in Figure 4 . Inspection of Figure 4 does not suggest a decline in the forecasting power of FundQ (i.e., particularly large coe¢ cients associated with the year dummies) in the 1995-1999 window.
To more formally check whether a shift in FundQ during the 1995-1999 window could explain an increase in the forecasting power of Q M kt in that period, we augment the speci…cation in Eq. (11) with an interaction term for Bubble and FundQ. We …nd that the FundQ has the same explanatory power over investment spending in and out of the tech bubble; i.e., the interaction term's estimated coe¢ cient is small and insigni…cant (output omitted).
Relatedly, notice that although we presume that prices may have deviated signi…cantly from fundamentals in the late 1990's, we use information from that period to compute FundQ in our tests. Although it is hard to anticipate how potential problems arising from this approach would bias our …ndings, it may be worth it checking its consequences. In an unreported table, we perform the estimations of Table 6 in a way that eliminates the in ‡uence of equity prices over the [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] window from the computation of FundQ. In short, the …rst-stage regression for FundQ disregards the bubble period, but the resulting loading coe¢ cients (associated with the 20 fundamental variables)
are …t on to the entire sample to construct FundQ. This leads to no changes in our conclusions.
Alternative Proxies for Fundamentals and the Tech Bubble Another potential limitation of our computation of FundQ is that the information we use regarding …rm fundamentals is backwardlooking. In particular, one could argue that, even amongst manufacturing …rms, the 1995-1999 period may have been characterized by shifts in fundamentals that cannot be captured by proxies such as past sales, pro…ts, and capital growth. In that case, any variable containing forward-looking market information would perform better in a investment spending regression; hence the increase in the sensitivity of investment to Q M kt during the late 1990's. To verify that this story does not underlie our results, we recalculate FundQ using a forward-looking measure of …rm fundamentals. Speci…cally, fol- Table 7 . Although only 42% of the …rm-years in our original sample provide valid observations of long-term earnings forecasts, our main results remain largely unchanged. The same conclusion applies when we include leads, i.e., future realizations, of our fundamental variables when computing FundQ (the premise is that expectations of future fundamentals are, on average, reasonably well-proxied by future values of the fundamental variables). it less likely that we obtain signi…cant estimates over our long sample. On the other hand, because we may glean …ner information about the price dynamics over the bubble period -something we cannot obtain with a single time dummy -these estimations could be more revealing.
The results from this test are reported in Table 8 . The estimations cover the 1984 to 2003 period. Besides replacing the Bubble dummy with the December-to-December change in the NASDAQ Composite Index ( N ASDAQ), we add the change in the S&P 500 Index ( S&P 500) to control for changes in the overall market. 27 The table shows that the coe¢ cient returned for Q N ASDAQ is positive and highly statistically signi…cant in all but the size-based …nancially constrained partitions.
At the same time, that interaction coe¢ cient is equal to zero in all of the unconstrained partitions.
These results make it more transparent that a pricing innovation in the tech sector in the late 1990's drives increases in the investment spending of …nancially constrained manufacturers. Table 9 replicates the tests of Table 6 using the switching regression approach. The results reported in the new table agree with our main inferences: the impact of mispricing on the investment of constrained …rms is pronounced during the tech bubble years, but not outside of that period. Once again, 1 is insigni…cant, while 5 is positive and statistically signi…cant for …nancially constrained …rms. In addition, the impact of market valuation during the bubble ( 1 + 5 ) is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 5% test level. For unconstrained …rms, in contrast, the bubble has no impact on the relation between valuation and investment ( 5 ' 0, with 1 < 0). Table 9 about here In all, the patterns we observe in manufacturing investment over the technology bubble agree with the notion that bubbles can have welfare-increasing cross-sectoral e¤ects. In the following sections, we provide detailed evidence on the …nancing mechanism through which our proposed story operates.
Market Valuation and Equity Issuance During Bubbles
According to Fischer and Merton (1984) , the mechanism through which valuation in ‡uences investment is one whereby managers act on mispricing by issuing stocks and investing the proceeds. This implies an active …nancing channel. We have presented evidence of mispricing-driven investment in non-bubble sectors during the late 1990's bubble, but the way in which this happens has not been fully characterized. We now take our analysis to its next logical step and look at whether mispricing also drives issuance activity over and above what is implied by the attractiveness (or fundamentals)
of investment during the bubble. Again, we look at these dynamics across …nancially constrained and unconstrained non-bubble …rms.
The literature lacks a speci…cation for equity issuance that directly suits our analysis. As a starting point, our empirical speci…cation amounts to using stock issuance in place of investment on the left-hand side of Eq. (11). Arguably, however, a …rm's pre-existing capital structure might in ‡uence its marginal propensity to issue stocks. 29 At the same time, we have weaker priors for the role of
CashFlow in the issuance model. Accordingly, we replace CashFlow by the …rm's lagged ratio of long term debt-to-asset ratio (Leverage) in our benchmark speci…cation. 30 Focusing on the same model dynamics considered above, we can write our empirical speci…cation as follows:
where Issuance is computed as ( item #60 + item #74 item #36) divided by the beginningof-period equity stock (item #60). 31 As in the estimation of Eq. (11) above, we correct the error structure in Eq. (12) for heteroskedasticity and within-period error correlation.
The results from Eq. (12) are reported in Table 10 . The estimations conform to our prior results on investment: they support the hypothesis that the investment of …nancially constrained 2 9 The view that debt-to-asset ratios directly or indirectly a¤ect a …rm's marginal decision to issue equity is standard in the capital structure literature. For instance, while proponents of the trade-o¤ theory enter a …rm's leverage in the issuance equation directly (e.g., Hovakimian et al. (2001) ), proponents of the pecking order theory do it indirectly when they enter interest payments (debt service) in "…nancing de…cits" (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ).
3 0 Whether we use CashFlow or Leverage (or include both of these variables) in our model does not alter our inferences. 3 1 Following Baker et al. (2003) and Fama and French (2005) , our issuance proxy uses book rather than market values.
non-tech manufacturers during the technology bubble was driven by an overvaluation channel. In particular, the results in Table 10 show that constrained manufacturers issued more shares in response to the non-fundamental component of market value during the late 1990's. These …ndings on the increased issuance-valuation sensitivity are systematic and robust, holding at better than the 5% test level across all but one of the constrained partitions (the partition based on bond ratings is signi…cant at 12%). The table also shows that the interplay between equity valuation and stock issuance is markedly di¤erent for …nancially unconstrained …rms: the marginal propensity to issue stock in response to increases in Q M kt is generally negative for unconstrained manufacturers, and this propensity declines further during the tech bubble. When we compare estimates of issuance-valuation sensitivities of constrained and unconstrained non-tech manufacturers over the tech bubble, we …nd that they di¤er at highly statistically signi…cant levels across all partitions; that is, constrained ( 1 + 5 ) > unconstrained ( 1 + 5 ) at better than the 1% test level.
Finally, our estimations yield a mostly negative relation between ex-ante leverage levels and marginal equity issuance. Our results suggest that when two …rms have similar fundamentals, the …rm with higher leverage may …nd it more costly to issue new shares, since these bear higher distress risk. We stress that the prior literature on the valuation-investment relation provides only limited evidence on the impact of mispricing on issuance activity. To our knowledge, only Morck et al. (1990) , Baker et al. (2003) , Gilchrist et al. (2005) , and Chirinko and Schaller (2006) explicitly study this connection using …rm-level data. Morck et al. estimate a logit regression of the likelihood that the …rm will increase its outstanding shares by more than 10% as a function of stock returns. Those authors …nd only marginal evidence that issuance responds to returns over and above fundamentals.
Baker et al. …nd a positive relation between issuance and Q M kt . We obtain similar results if we exclude …rm fundamentals (FundQ) from the speci…cation. However, as Table 10 shows, once FundQ is included, Q M kt no longer signi…cantly a¤ects issuance activity (except for constrained …rms during the bubble). In a VAR framework, Gilchrist et al. …nd that issuance responds to increases in the dispersion of analysts'forecasts (their measure of mispricing). Chirinko and Schaller …nd that …rms that, they argue, are more subject to mispricing (glamour …rms) …nance a larger proportion of their new investment via stock issuance. Those papers do not focus on the dynamics of equity prices and issuance during bubble episodes nor emphasize the role of standard …nancing constraints on the relation between stock mispricing and issuance.
The Impact of Market Valuation on Investment and Savings During Bubbles
While we have shown that …nancially constrained manufacturers behave di¤erently from unconstrained manufacturers during the technology bubble, recall that our identi…cation strategy is based on the fact that constrained manufacturers and tech …rms di¤er in fundamental ways -they are in di¤erent business paradigms. A concern is that those two sets of …rms are similar in a number of observables (such as size), and the results we have documented for constrained manufacturers regarding investment and issuance could as well be found for tech …rms. Fortunately, the literature o¤ers guidance as to how to identify what drives di¤erences in the real and …nancial policies of those two types of …rms. Establishing those di¤erences helps us further characterize our story about the e¤ects of market misvaluation in the presence of …nancial constraints.
One key dimension in which to di¤erentiate bubble and non-bubble constrained …rms concerns how they handle the proceeds from the sale of stocks. According to Blanchard et al. (1993) , …rms whose investment prospects give rise to a pricing bubble must channel the proceeds from stock issuance towards business re-investment. For those …rms, market (mis)pricing is a function of perceived investment opportunities and choosing to hoard proceeds from equity issuance can burst the bubble -saving cash signals that managers don't see business re-investing as a pro…table alternative.
In contrast, research on the …nancial policy of constrained …rms shows that those …rms allocate new, excess in ‡ows towards both investment and cash savings (see Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2007) ). According to this literature, constrained …rms use excess funds for current investment but they also hoard cash -cash allows them to invest more in future periods as well. These two literatures suggest that while one should not see bubble …rms saving cash out of proceeds from stock issuance during a bubble, non-bubble constrained …rms should display a greater tendency towards saving cash at times when external funds are cheap and investment opportunities are unchanged.
To test our story, we identify how funds raised through equity issuance during bubbles are split between spending and savings. We do so by following the literature on corporate investment and liquidity (Fazzari et al. (1988) and Almeida et al. (2004) ). The test speci…cation builds on the benchmark model used above, but features important modi…cations. First, the test calls for the estimation of a system of simultaneous equations explaining spending and savings -these decisions are endogenous to each other and we treat them as such. Second, the contrast groups are no longer unconstrained versus constrained non-bubble …rms, but bubble versus non-bubble constrained …rms.
De…ne Investment and Issuance as in Sections 2.4 and 3.2. Additionally, de…ne CashSaving as the change in the holdings of cash and other liquid securities ( item #1) divided by lagged assets.
We examine the simultaneous responses of cash savings and investment spending to equity issuance initiatives in and out of the bubble via a (3SLS) system of equations: 
We use lagged levels of the dependent variables (which are in changes) in order to identify the system of Eqs. (13)- (14). 32 Accordingly, CashStock in Eq. (13) is de…ned as COMPUSTAT item #1 over item #6, and CapitalStock in Eq. (14) is item #8 over item #6. 33 The system allows one to gauge the marginal contribution of funds raised in the capital markets to cash savings and investment spending, accounting for the simultaneity of these decisions (note 7 in both equations). More important for our purposes is whether such contribution changes during bubble periods. This is captured by the coe¢ cient returned for 6 . Since the theory only draws clear distinctions about the cash savings behavior of non-bubble constrained …rms and bubble …rms during the bubble, we focus on the estimates returned for 6 from Eq. (13). Estimates from Eq. (14) are trivially identical across all …rm types -issuance is positively associated with investment in and out of the bubble -and are omitted.
Results from the 3SLS estimation are reported in Table 11 . The table has …ve rows. In the …rst four rows, we report the cash savings equation coe¢ cients that are returned from each of our groups of constrained non-tech manufacturers. The …fth row reports results from the savings equation of the technology …rm group (SICs 481 and 737). The estimates reveal very distinctive patterns in savings behavior across non-bubble constrained …rms and bubble …rms, in and out of bubbles.
Non-bubble constrained …rms generally channel proceeds from issuance towards cash savings:
4 is positive and statistically signi…cant across all partitions, except that based on bond ratings.
Notably, those …rms'propensity to save cash increased signi…cantly during the bubble: 6 is positive and statistically signi…cant across all partitions. This is pattern is not mirrored in the policies of unconstrained manufacturers. 34 That constrained manufacturers save more of the proceeds from stock issuance during the tech bubble supports the hypothesis that those …rms take advantage of the low cost of equity to accumulate funds for future periods, when their investment opportunity set might actually improve (recall, we argue that the underlying opportunity set of non-tech manufacturers is not a¤ected by the tech bubble). This reveals an additional mechanism through which cross-sectoral value spillover e¤ects have long-term welfare implications: the tech-fueled stock market run-up may have boosted otherwise constrained corporate investment in other sectors of the economy both during and after the late 1990's, through accumulated savings.
A di¤erent story is observed for …rms whose actions may in ‡uence the bubble (technology …rms in the late 1990's). Consistent with Blanchard et al. (1993) , our estimates suggest that although technology …rms display some propensity to save cash out of equity issuance in ‡ows ( 4 > 0), they overtly avoided hoarding funds from the sale of stocks in their cash accounts during the bubble ( 6 < 0; 4 + 6 ' 0). The results from this section conform to our priors about the impact of equity valuation on …rm …nancial constraints. More importantly, they provide novel insights for research on the implications of market valuation. The literature has virtually ignored the impact of mispricing on …rm …nancial policies, such as savings and issuance decisions. Our results suggest that the examination of such policies can be an interesting subject for future studies on this topic.
Summary and Conclusions
Do …rms issue stock when prices seem irrationally high? What do …rms do with the proceeds from the sale of overvalued stocks? Do they save or invest those funds? Is value created or destroyed in the process? These questions naturally emerge when equity prices seem to deviate from fundamental values. Firms have a natural monopoly over the supply of equity and it can be argued that managers should sell their …rms'stocks whenever market discount rates are low. This line of reasoning implies a direct link between stock market valuation and …rm investment spending, a link that can lead to suboptimal …rm behavior (e.g., overinvestment) and may become a matter of economic policy-making (see Desai and Goolsbee (2004) and White (2006) ).
Our study looks at the impact of market values on corporate investment in a way that sidesteps the issue of endogeneity between valuation and investment and that allows us to assess ine¢ ciencies in real corporate investment. We suppose that mispricing has its roots in investors'inability to correctly forecast the impact of innovations to technology and preferences in some particular industries.
Further, we recognize that once mispricing is observed it may spread to other sectors. Accordingly, in the context of a widespread price run-up (or bubble), we look for industries whose fundamentals remain unchanged, but whose market valuations have noticeably increased. We then seek to isolate, within these "non-bubble" industries, the …rms that most likely face a wedge between the external cost of funds and the marginal product of investment. These "…nancially constrained" …rms should unambiguously bene…t from a decline in the cost of external …nancing (high stock prices).
To develop our test strategy, we use a sample of manufacturers over the 1971-2003 period and estimate standard investment equations where investment is regressed on market values (Q M kt ). These regressions suggest that Q M kt in ‡uences both …nancially constrained and unconstrained …rms' investment, but with a stronger impact on the investment spending of constrained …rms. We then expunge from Q M kt the component that is predicted by …rm "fundamentals" (such as past sales growth and pro…tability). This renders Q M kt insigni…cant. Subsequent tests reveal what happens during bubbles. In particular, we look at the behavior of the non-tech manufacturers in our sample during the late 1990's tech-led bubble period. We …nd that while the non-fundamental component of prices has no impact on the investment of …nancially unconstrained manufacturers during the tech bubble, the impact of mispricing on the investment of constrained manufacturers is positive and strong. Our results suggest that bubbles may have the potential e¤ect of improving welfare by easing the constraints on investment funding of credit-rationed …rms, without leading to wasteful overinvestment by …rms that have access to fairly-priced funds.
While our baseline results imply the existence of a link between mispricing and investment, they do not show how mispricing a¤ects investment. To further characterize our claims, we turn to the identi…cation of the mechanism through which mispricing a¤ects …rm …nancing and investment activities. First, similarly to our analysis of investment spending, we look at whether market valuation drives equity issuance over and above what is suggested by the attractiveness of investment during the late 1990's. Consistent with the logic of our story, we …nd that …nancially constrained …rms in non-bubble sectors issued more shares in response to mispricing during the tech bubble period.
At the same time, unconstrained …rms in those same sectors did not adjust their issuance policy to mispricing. We then seek to di¤erentiate the behavior of constrained non-bubble …rms and bubble …rms. The theory suggests that bubble …rms should channel the proceeds from stock issuance towards their investment activity, away from cash. In contrast, constrained non-bubble …rms should allocate marginal cash in ‡ows towards cash. This is exactly what we …nd. Our joint analysis of …rms'real (investment) and …nancial (savings and issuance) policies are new to the literature.
The evidence of our paper suggests that market (mis)valuation can drive corporate investment, issuance, and savings policies. However, our …ndings are inconsistent with the notion that managers systematically issue overvalued stocks and invest in ways that transfer wealth from new to old shareholders, destroying economic value in the process. On the contrary, cross-sector spillover mispricing seems to enhance welfare by relaxing …nancial constraints and allowing for investment spending in valuable projects that otherwise would go underfunded. We believe these …ndings have interesting implications for future research in corporate …nance and may also help economic policymakers. Assets is the dollar amount of total assets (COMSPUSTAT's item #6). F ixedCapital is item #8 divided by item # 6. Investment is the ratio of fixed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged fixed capital stock (item #8). CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments (item #13 -item #15 -item #16 -item #19 -item #21) divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Q Mkt is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24 × item #25) -item #60 -item #74) / (item #6). Issuance is net equity issuance divided by lagged equity, or the ratio of ∆item #60 + ∆item #74 -∆item #36 over lagged item #60. Leverage is computed as item #9 divided by item #6. CashStock is item #1 divided by item #6. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock. The table reports only the coefficients associated with market valuation and firm fundamentals. In column 1, F undQ is replaced with a set of 20 firm-and industry-level variables capturing fundamentals. This set of variables comprise two lags of the following: firm profitability, firm investment, firm sales growth, firm liquidity, firm leverage, firm market capitalization, industry investment, industry sales growth, and industry R&D spending. The coefficients returned for these variables are omitted; only the coefficient associated with Q Mkt is reported. In column 2, the estimates are from a full-fledge 2SLS version of the estimations of Table 4 , where standard errors are corrected for the fact that F undQ is a "constructed regressor." In column 3, the models used in Table 4 (11) with an alternative control for firm value fundamentals (F undQ). F undQ is now the projection of Q Mkt on financial analysts' earnings forecasts. All firm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1989-2003 period. The sample firms are from select manufacturing ("non-bubble") SICs. Investment is the ratio of fixed capital expenditures over lagged fixed capital stock. Q Mkt is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on the median 1-year ahead forecasted value of firm earnings. CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Bubble is an indicator variable for the 1995-1999 period. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-period error correlation using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (11) with an alternative proxy for the tech bubble (Bubble). Bubble is now proxied by changes in the NASDAQ Index. All firm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971-2003 period. The sample firms are from select manufacturing ("non-bubble") SICs. Investment is the ratio of fixed capital expenditures over lagged fixed capital stock. Q Mkt is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock. ∆NASDAQ is the annual change in the NASDAQ Composite Index (December to December). ∆S&P 500 is the annual change in the S&P 500 Index. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-period error correlation using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. This table displays results for switching regression (with firm-fixed effects) estimations of Eq. (11). These estimations allow for endogenous firm selection into financially constrained and financially unconstrained categories via maximum likelihood. The"regime selection" regression uses payout ratio, asset size, a dummy for a bond ratings, and a dummy for commercial paper ratings as selection variables to classify firms into constraint categories. All firm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971-2003 period. The sample firms are from select manufacturing ("non-bubble") SICs. Investment is the ratio of fixed capital expenditures over lagged fixed capital stock. Q Mkt is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments divided by the beginning-ofperiod capital stock. Bubble is an indicator variable for the 1995-1999 period. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-period error correlation using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (Eq. (12) in the text). All firm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971-2003 period. The sample firms are from select manufacturing ("non-bubble") SICs. Issuance is net equity issuance to lagged equity. Q Mkt is the market value of assets divided by the book value of equity. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets (this variable enters the specification in lagged form). Bubble is an indicator variable for the 1995-1999 period. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-period error correlation using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. CashSaving is the change in the holdings of cash and other liquid securities divided by lagged capital. Q Mkt is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. F undQ is the projection of Q Mkt on various industry-and firm-level variables capturing the firm's marginal profitability of investment (see text for details). CashF low is gross operating income minus interest, tax, and dividend payments divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock. Issuance is net equity issuance to lagged equity. Bubble is an indicator variable for the 1995-1999 period. Investment is the ratio of fixed capital expenditures over lagged fixed capital stock. CashStock is the ratio of cash and liquid securities to total assets (this variable enters the specification in lagged form). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
